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Abstract
Using a legal history methodology, this paper examines existing marine
renewable energy law and policy in Nova Scotia with a focus on its
application in the Bay of Fundy. This paper critically assesses the current
approach to coastal management in light of recent recommendations
summarized in the Fournier report. This paper argues that, despite clear
calls to develop integrated ocean management and marine spatial planning
in policies and regulations, Canada and Nova Scotia have failed to do so
because of unclear federal-provincial boundaries. Ambiguous domestic
borders in the Bay of Fundy have been at the source of an overly cautious,
issue-driven and jurisdictionally uncertain approach to ocean governance
which has permeated marine renewable energy law. This approach is
unsuited for today’s environmental objectives and does not hold promise
for goals to reconcile competing interests in increasingly industrialised
waters. Through a historical account of shifting limits in the Bay of Fundy,
this paper connects existing doubts and frictions associated with domestic
offshore boundaries to ineffective coastal management in an attempt to
renew interest in federal-provincial maritime delimitation.

1. PhD Student, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Ottawa, Canada. This research
was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
(SSHRC), the Canadian Energy Law Foundation and the University of Ottawa. The author
would like to thank professors Elizabeth Judge, Heather McLeod-Kilmurray and Sophie
Thériault (University of Ottawa) for their guidance in writing this paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is now widely acknowledged that managing and regulating coastal
activities in a vacuum does not serve environmental and social interests.2
Integrated ocean management and marine spatial planning have surfaced
as guiding concepts for coastal governance from this widespread
recognition. However, despite clear references to integrated ocean
management within the Oceans Act 3, and related regional action plans, 4
such type of management remains an aspiration for the marine renewable
energy sector in Nova Scotia. The provincial Marine Renewable-energy
Act 5 (hereinafter “the Act”) follows a narrow approach to coastal
regulation and stays shy of addressing and preventing potential conflicts
of use in marine areas. Despite clear calls to include marine spatial
planning and other inclusive management tools within marine renewable
energy law and policy, 6 why have recent regulatory developments stayed
clear of this recommendation?
Using a legal history methodology, I argue that persisting ambiguity
on federal-provincial boundaries in the Bay of Fundy has silenced the issue
of regulatory jurisdiction and contributed to a very near-sighted
framework for the tidal energy sector in Nova Scotia. In an effort to avoid
jurisdictional confrontation, the Government of Nova Scotia has failed to
address coastal planning and management in an inclusive and wholesome
manner. Enacted legislation is specifically tailored to the immediate needs
of the tidal energy industry. This is reflective of a “tippy-toe” approach or,
as some have called it, an issue-driven practice inconsistent with the
foundations of pre-emptive spatial planning and integrated ocean
management. 7
At the very core, the issue of jurisdiction is a constitutional debate.
This has been recalled during some of the most important milestone
2. Sylvie Guénette & Jackie Alder, Lessons from Marine Protected Areas and
Integrated Ocean Management Initiatives in Canada, 35 COASTAL MANAGEMENT 51−78,
51 (2007).
3. Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c 31 (Can).
4. Fisheries & Oceans Canada, Regional Oceans Plan - Maritime Region:
Background and Program Description (Dartmouth, NS: Bedford Institute of
Oceanography, 2014).
5. Marine Renewable-energy Act, S.N.S. 2015, c 32 (Can.).
6. Robert O. Fournier, Marine Renewable Energy Legislation: A Consultative
Process, Halifax: Report to the Government of Nova Scotia (2011), at 26.
7. Sue Nichols & David Monahan, Fuzzy Boundaries in a Sea of Uncertainty:
Canada’s Offshore Boundaries in The Coastal Cadastre - Onland, Offshore - Proceedings
of the New Zealand Institute of Surveyors Annual Meeting (Bay of Islands, NZ: 1999), at
10.
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moments in Canadian offshore resource administration history. 8 Section
92A of the Constitution Act, 1867 9 sets out that “In each province, the
legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to . . . development,
conservation and management of sites and facilities in the province for the
generation and production of electrical energy.” 10 Determining whether
the Bay of Fundy is in the provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick,
in whole or in part, is therefore important. 11 However, historical evidence
suggests that offshore jurisdiction has been a taboo subject in Canada for
some time. Without attempting to resolve the thorny issue of domestic
jurisdiction, this paper examines the current legal framework and focuses
on inconsistent jurisdictional discourses to reveal the influence of unclear
borders on offshore governance in the Bay of Fundy.
Increased awareness on the correlation between territorial ambiguity
and a regulatory approach that fails to address competing interests in a
reconciling fashion might just be what it takes to renew a faded interest in
domestic maritime boundaries. Some have argued that “[o]wing to the
different and sometimes unique historical development of the Canadian
provinces from their colonial days, it is doubtful if this matter [of
jurisdiction of offshore resources] will be finally determined until each
province has had its day in court.” 12 Others have instead put forth that, in
a Canadian context, these conflicts are more likely to be resolved through
political rather than judicial means.13 Whether inside or outside a
courtroom, the issue of domestic boundaries in the Bay of Fundy is one
that needs fixing. Drawing federal-provincial borders is necessary for a
more sustainable approach to marine and coastal management.

8. When federal Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau announced the establishment
of resource administration lines, the Member of Parliament for the riding of Lotbinière
stated that “it would be both in the interest of the federal government and the provinces to
meet and define clearly the jurisdiction of the governments, on the federal and provincial
level, because, in the final analysis it concerns the very essence of the B.N.A. Act.” House
of Commons Debates, 28th Parl, 1st Sess, No 3 (2 December 1968), at 3344 (André Fortin).
9. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 7 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1895,
Appendix ǁ, no 5 (Can.).
10. Meinhard Doelle et al., Tidal Energy: Governance Options for NS: Final Report,
Halifax: Marine & Environmental Law Institute at Dalhousie University (2006), at 8
(emphasis added).
11. Id. at 8−9.
12. John B. Ballem, “Oil and Gas and the Canadian Constitution on Land and Under
the Sea” in The Constitution and the Future of Canada: Special Lectures of the Law Society
of Upper Canada (Toronto: R. De Boo, 1978), at 270.
13. Roderick Logan, Mineral Resource Administration Lines, 23 THE PROFESSIONAL
GEOGRAPHER 160−163, 161 (1971).
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Part II of this paper first discusses the recommendations set out in the
Fournier report on marine renewable energy legislation. It then examines
failed policy attempts to follow Fournier’s advice on integrated ocean
management and marine spatial planning while emphasizing an apparent
connection between such failure and jurisdictional uncertainty. Part II
concludes with a legislative history of the Marine Renewable-energy Act,
illustrating a clear dismissal of integrated management principles. Part III
first traces the colonial boundary history in the Bay of Fundy and then
focuses on the post-Confederation discourse that brought distortions to a
previously straightforward delimitation. It also explores the emergence of
mineral resource administrative lines and their contributions to the
domestic geopolitical landscape. Lastly, Part III highlights a regulatory
pattern that resulted from jurisdictional uncertainty, a pattern in tune with
recent legal and policy developments in the marine renewable sector.
II. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK: CONTRASTING EXPECTATIONS WITH
REALITY
A. The Fournier Report: A Guide to Future Legislation
When Nova Scotia’s former Minister of Energy presented the Marine
Renewable-energy Act as an Act that “follow[ed] through on Dr. Bob
Fournier's recommendations,” 14 one had reason to believe that the Act
incorporated at least some reference to marine spatial planning. Robert
Fournier’s report, “Marine renewable energy legislation: a consultative
approach,” stressed the benefits of marine spatial planning on multiple
occasions. The report was commissioned by the Government of Nova
Scotia in 2010 at a time when it wished to obtain further clarity on what to
include in future marine renewable energy law. Despite the report’s
insistence on marine planning, the overall idea behind this spatial approach
to offshore governance remained notoriously absent from the adopted
legal and policy framework.
In his report, Fournier pointed to integrated coastal management and
marine spatial planning as tools to balance competing interests at sea,
emphasizing the popularity of these tools in marine renewable energy law
abroad. 15 He noted existing conflicts between several coastal activities and
environmental interests, and argued that “[m]arine renewable energy
represents but one more potential usage that carries with it potential
14. Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 62nd Assembly, No. 2 (7 May
2015), at 5150, 5152 (Hon Michel Samson).
15. Fournier, supra note 6, at 5.
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benefits and conflicts.” 16 Fournier saw possible spatial conflicts with the
aquaculture sector and added that the provincial Fisheries and Coastal
Resources Act 17 contained no provision dealing with activity overlap. 18
The Marine Renewable-energy Act later addressed this issue in a rather
uncompromising manner, simply amending the Fisheries and Coastal
Resources Act to grant precedence to Marine Renewable Electricity
Areas. 19 In his report, Fournier had instead proposed developing a marine
spatial plan to prevent activity conflict between the aquaculture sector and
the marine renewable sector. 20
The report encouraged Nova Scotia’s Department of Energy to “play
a leadership role in advancing [integrated ocean management] in parallel
with the development of the [marine renewable energy] sector.” 21
Recommendation 10 of the report specifically addressed the “lack of
clarity regarding jurisdictional responsibilities” in the Bay of Fundy and
pushed the provincial Department of Energy to negotiate with Fisheries
and Oceans Canada to increase Nova Scotia’s regulatory powers for the
management of the bay. 22 Fournier also recommended that “the
Department of Energy . . . actively embrace and advance the concept and
practice of Marine Spatial Planning.” 23 He warned against developing
premature legislation without a prior “clearly delineated plan.”24
Fournier’s motives to issue such a warning were that Nova Scotia did not
have a clear vision of what marine energy industries could look like in the
future. 25 Legislation without a prior plan “would be based on tenuous
assumptions regarding the stability or volatility of the energy, economic,
social, financial and technological sectors.”26 Although a plan for marine
renewable energy was eventually developed in 2012 by the Government
of Nova Scotia, its shortcomings are discussed in the section below.
Fournier encouraged the launch of a coastal strategy before “any
serious renewable energy activities” took place in the Bay of Fundy. 27 The
coastal strategy would protect different stakeholders, including marine
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 31.
Fisheries and Coastal Resources Act, S.N.S. 1996, c 25 (Can.).
Fournier, supra note 6, at 20.
Marine Renewable-energy Act, S.N.S. 2015, c 32, § 73 (Can.).
Fournier, supra note 6, at 20.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 32.
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renewable energy developers, and offer greater predictability in terms of
the allocation of ocean space. 28 Fournier insisted, “[o]nce again we draw
attention to the need for a Coastal Plan and especially the valuable subset
known as Marine Spatial Planning.” 29 At the time the report was issued,
Fournier contemplated delays in implementing a coastal strategy and
foresaw an activity decline for the Provincial Oceans Network, the leading
cross-sectoral platform for coastal activities. 30 His comments turned to
prophecy; the Provincial Oceans Network became minimally active and a
comprehensive coastal strategy embracing marine spatial planning
remains to be seen. 31
B. A Missing Coastal Strategy
In 2015, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation published a news
piece in which it referred to “a coastal strategy that could have been.”32
The expression well captured Nova Scotia’s failed attempt to adopt a
comprehensive provincial strategy for its coastal areas. The events leading
up to the current void are worth noting.
In 2008, a couple of years prior to the Fournier report, the
Government of Nova Scotia established a Coastal Management
Framework. 33 One of the short-term objectives of the framework was to
clarify federal and provincial roles and responsibilities concerning coastal
management. 34 This short-term objective visibly recognized jurisdictional
ambiguity between both levels of government although it did not explicitly
refer to jurisdiction per se. Still within the Coastal Management
Framework, the Government of Nova Scotia laid out strategic activities to
reach a better understanding of such roles and responsibilities. These
activities included establishing a Sustainable Coastal Development
Strategy and signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the
Government of Canada. 35

28. Id. at 32.
29. Id. at 60.
30. Id. at 32.
31. The last updates of the Provincial Oceans Network concern the Draft Coastal
Strategy later abandoned.
32. David Irish, Nova Scotia Urged to Develop Unified Coastal Erosion Plan, CBC
News (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/ns-lack-of-coastalmanagement-1.3346071 [https://perma.cc/BRJ5-B7Q4].
33. Nova Scotia, “Coastal Management Framework” (2009).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Ironically, the Memorandum signed in 2011 read that nothing in the
agreement would “be construed to be prejudicial to the interests of the
Parties concerning ownership or jurisdiction of coastal and marine areas,
submerged Crown lands and the seabed.” 36 The Memorandum specifically
addressed the need to focus on integrated ocean management and planning
within the Bay of Fundy area, 37 but the clause was significantly hampered
by the fact that the parties agreed “to clarify the roles and responsibilities
of the federal and provincial departments” at a later stage.38 The
Memorandum, instead of setting straight the respective responsibilities of
each government, as was originally agreed in the Coastal Management
Framework, dismissed jurisdiction-based arguments and postponed
further clarification of government roles.
As per the terms of the Coastal Management Framework, the
Government of Nova Scotia also undertook the task of creating a Coastal
Strategy in 2011. However, the strategy never made it past the draft
stage. 39 In early 2012, while the process was still ongoing, Nova Scotia’s
House of Assembly Committee on Resources discussed the draft strategy
at length. Several interventions made clear that federal-provincial conflicts
and ambiguities in the near-shore areas existed. Mr. Greg Roach, of the
Nova Scotia Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture, stated that the
federal Oceans Act’s far-reaching scope regarding coastal management
demanded provincial intervention:
we were saying, just a second, that’s getting very close to the
provincial domain. . . . [W]hen you get into the coastal zone where
all the users interact, there is a lot more material to start to work
on there, but it was, we believed, largely a provincial domain.
Then we said, okay, we’ve got to get our own house in order as
far as a coastal plan, coastal strategy, whatever you wish. 40
The coastal zone coordinator then argued that talks on a coastal strategy
were also driven by a desire to change the government’s reactive mindset,
as it was accustomed to “dealing with issues along [the] coast in a very
sector-based or one-off approach.” 41 He further stated, that “things like
coastal water quality, [Environment] would look at it from one angle,
36. Memorandum of Understanding Between Canada and Nova Scotia Respecting
Coastal and Oceans Management in Nova Scotia, March 23, 2011, clause G.
37. Id. at clause 2.2(b).
38. Id. at clause 2.3.
39. Irish, supra note 32.
40. Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly Committee on Resources, Hansard, (23
February 2012), at 4 (Greg Roach).
41. Id. at 5 (Justin Huston).
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[Fisheries] would look at it from a different angle” and therefore, no
coordinated approach resulted from this practice. 42 The continuing lack of
a coastal strategy suggests that these issues have changed little.
During the same committee hearing, a member asked government
representatives if the idea of a Coastal Act had been considered as a way
of moving beyond policy documents. 43 This proposition had previously
been put forth by the Coastal Coalition of Nova Scotia and the Ecology
Action Centre, who are both advocates for greater coastal management
efforts. The coastal zone coordinator responded that, although the option
was not totally discarded, it appeared to him that moving forward with a
Coastal Act would be “putting the cart before the horse.” 44 In May 2017,
five years after that initial proposition, talks on a provincial Ocean Act
resurfaced after renewed criticisms on the provincial government’s lax
approach to coastal management. 45
Seeing as the federal-provincial Memorandum of Understanding on
coastal management stayed clear of its original objective to define
government roles, and seeing as no coastal strategy was successfully
adopted at a provincial level, a safe assumption is that the Coastal
Management Framework’s goal to define clear federal and provincial
responsibilities (and therefore address the issue of jurisdiction) was never
accomplished. Instead, federal-provincial relations stayed at the level of
broad statements of cooperation. Fournier described cooperation between
both levels of government as “a reasonable approximation of the status
quo.” 46 Federal and provincial jurisdiction remained the elephant in the
room.
Despite the lack of a provincial coastal strategy embracing marine
spatial planning, Nova Scotia did adopt a strategy specific to marine
renewable energy. 47 Similarly, the federal government, through the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, also created a Regional Oceans Plan
for the Scotian Shelf, the Atlantic Coast, and the Bay of Fundy. 48
However, the contribution of these two strategies in light of integrated

42. Id.
43. Id. at 7 (Mat Whynott).
44. Id. at 8 (Justin Huston).
45. Michael Tutton, N.S. Liberals Promise Coastal Law, Face Criticism for Lax
Approach to Polluters CTV News (8 May 2017), https://atlantic.ctvnews.ca/n-s-liberalspromise-coastal-law-face-criticism-for-lax-approach-to-polluters-1.3403477
[https://perma.cc/JF4V-VSJ6].
46. Fournier, supra note 6, at 52.
47. Nova Scotia Dept. of Energy, Marine Renewable Energy Strategy (May 2012).
48. Regional Oceans Plan, supra note 4.
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ocean management and marine spatial planning principles which the
Fournier report aggressively put forward remains rather limited.
The Marine Renewable Energy Strategy, although apparently “built
off the recommendations made by Dr. Fournier,” 49 contains only a single
mention of marine spatial planning in a footnote to the regulatory plan
headline. 50 The footnote simply reiterates Fournier’s recommendation to
advance the concept and practice of marine spatial planning with no
further context. The Strategy’s regulatory plan does not push for marine
spatial planning as a regulatory priority and this is reflected in the outcome
legislation examined in the following section. The Marine Renewable
Energy Strategy acknowledges that ocean turbines “may affect tourism,
landscapes, seascapes, habitats, and ecosystems,” and recognizes that
ocean energy projects require “an integrated management approach.” 51
However, the strategy’s way of embracing integrated ocean management
is by turning to the Provincial Oceans Network and aligning marine energy
activities with the provincial Coastal Strategy. 52 As discussed earlier in
this section, the provincial Coastal Strategy was abandoned in 2013,
leaving integrated ocean management plans for the marine renewable
sector severely amputated.
The Marine Renewable Energy Strategy further notes that the tidal
energy sector has been managed by an informal One Window Standing
Committee with members of federal and provincial governments
“interested in, or with authority for, marine projects.” 53 The phrasing is
significant as it once more evidences extreme caution and a persisting
collaborative status quo in the face of jurisdictional ambiguity. The
Strategy notes that the One Window Standing Committee delivered good
results in the context of a demonstration project but that “a more
customized and improved integrated regulatory system” could be
necessary with the expansion of the marine renewable sector.54 In his
report, Fournier similarly expressed a desire to move towards a more
regulated framework. 55
At the federal level, the Regional Oceans Plan for the Bay of Fundy
simply “supports a spatial approach to oceans and coastal planning and
49. Nova Scotia Dept. of Energy, Marine Renewable Energy Legislation,
(December 15, 2017), https://energy.novascotia.ca/renewables/marine-renewable-energy
/marine-renewable-energy-legislation [https://perma.cc/QW2L-UA4V].
50. Marine Renewable Energy Strategy, supra note 47, at 27.
51. Id. at 33.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 28.
54. Id.
55. Id.; Fournier, supra note 6, at 49.
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management” and recognizes that “the principles of marine and coastal
spatial planning can provide . . . solutions for oceans and coastal
management problems.” 56 Although the Plan explicitly links marine
spatial planning with the marine renewable energy sector, it is silent on
any course of action. In fact, the Plan addresses the issue in a rather
peculiar way by including an illustration of marine spatial conflicts in
relation to tidal energy without elaborating further. 57 This self-contained
figure, however, offers one of the most comprehensive explanations of
why marine spatial planning matters in the Bay of Fundy. It contains four
consecutive maps, each showing specific interests in the bay, and
highlights their overlapping and conflicting nature. The figure’s
explanatory text deserves to be quoted in full, for it captures the essence
of activity conflict in the Bay of Fundy and the benefits of marine spatial
planning:
[The figure] illustrates some of the overlapping ocean uses and
conservation priorities in the context of 16 potential tidal energy
sites identified in the Bay of Fundy. Marine spatial planning can
help resolve tidal energy development options through
identification, awareness raising and potential avoidance of spatial
and temporal ocean use conflicts throughout the Bay. Map
overlays include several marine protection priorities such as North
Atlantic right whale critical habitat, the Musquash Estuary Marine
Protected Area, and several well-known Ecologically and
Biologically Significant Areas. Coastal aquaculture sites occur on
both sides of the bay, supporting an active local marine economy
in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The bay is a very productive
area for multiple fisheries that would blanket the map if all fishing
activities were displayed … Commercial shipping routes into
Saint John Harbour are illustrated by two dominate vessel traffic
patterns at the entrance to the bay. In terms of seabed
infrastructure, an active submarine telecommunications cable
crosses the area at mid-bay. 58
As it will be explained in the section below, Marine Renewable
Electricity Areas (MREAs) established under the provincial Marine
Renewable-Electricity Act, have been defined without resorting to marine
spatial planning. Concretely, this means that some MREAs extend to some

56. Regional Oceans Plan, supra note 4, at 7.
57. Id. at 24.
58. Id.
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critical mammal habitats and areas associated with traditional practices
such as fishing.
This section attempts to provide an overview of the limited
contribution of policy work towards integrated ocean management and
marine spatial planning with a focus on marine renewable energy in the
Bay of Fundy. A careful assessment of the policy outcomes examined
above reveals that, at the heart of the current framework (or lack thereof),
lies a buried debate on jurisdiction. At times, explicitly and at other times
implicitly, federal-provincial tensions over jurisdiction have been a
shaping factor in the decision-making process. Recognizing the need for
coordinated coastal management in political discourse has not been greatly
problematic. Developing and operationalizing such management,
however, has. As noted during a meeting of the Nova Scotia Standing
Committee on Resources, the idea behind a provincial coastal strategy was
to take concrete action “instead of just saying at a high level that we love
the coast, we want good, sustainable jobs and a clean environment.” 59
However, the strategy fell into oblivion and concrete action along with it.
It is perhaps useful to recall that both the provincial Coastal Strategy
and the federal-provincial Memorandum of Understanding were intended
to achieve greater clarity on federal and provincial roles under the Coastal
Management Framework. None of these so-called “strategic activities”
fulfilled their desired effect. The Memorandum explicitly placed the issue
of roles and jurisdiction off-limits, recognizing the sensitive nature of the
question and foreseeing a certain polarity in the arguments of federal and
provincial governments. Additionally, the Marine Renewable Energy
Strategy relied on a non-existent provincial Coastal Strategy to articulate
integrated ocean management. The federal Coastal Plan for the Bay of
Fundy, although remarkably explicit on the concrete benefits of marine
spatial planning, provided no indication as to how (and under what
regulatory authority) such planning could be achieved.
In light of the above, and considering Fournier’s assertion that federal
and provincial jurisdictional issues concerning marine renewable energy
“are complex and unlikely to be resolved in the near future,” namely
because the domestic jurisdiction over the of Bay of Fundy is unsettled, 60
the correlation between undefined federal-provincial boundaries and
failure to implement integrated ocean management becomes obvious.
Before discussing boundaries in the Bay of Fundy, the following section
59. Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly Committee on Resources, Hansard, (23
February 2012) (Justin Huston) [hereinafter Legislative Assembly Committee on
Resources (23 February 2012)].
60. Fournier, supra note 6, at 17-18; Doelle supra note 10, at 8-9.
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provides a brief overview of how the legal framework, just as the policy
framework, fell short of pushing for a holistic, pre-emptive and spatially
aware structure for marine renewable energy regulation.
C. The Marine Renewable Energy Act
In 2015, the Nova Scotia legislative assembly adopted the Marine
Renewable-energy Act. In 2017, prior to its entry into force, the Act was
amended to better suit the needs of an evolving industry. 61 During the
second reading of the amending act, the Minister of Energy stressed
multiple times that these amendments were addressing and responding to
the needs of developers. 62 He insisted, “[w]e’re giving industry the tools
they need to prove their innovations work. We’re being responsive to the
needs of the private sector.” 63 His comments, which clearly put the
industry as the driving force of the legislative process, set the stage for a
proposal to include demonstration permits within the act and alter the
boundaries of a previously established MREA. The motivations behind the
amendment reflected a reactive and sector-based approach, an approach
which the failed Coastal Strategy, a few years back, had tried to suppress. 64
The near-sightedness of this industry-tailored Act was made apparent
by recurrent references to the needs of a single company, Big Moon
Power, during parliamentary debates. A member of the Nova Scotia
legislative assembly went as far as saying that, according to her, the Act
appeared to be custom-made for a specific player of the tidal energy
industry. Mrs. Lisa Roberts recognized that Big Moon Power had captured
the interest of decisionmakers and warned against the perils of enacting
legislation with narrow goals and visible favoritism:
People are excited about Big Moon Power, and I certainly think
we need Nova Scotia to create the space where someone with a
great idea that appears to work in prototypes can fully deploy it
and see how it works. That is what I understand the point of this
bill to be. A question that I hope might get explored a little bit in
Law Amendments Committee is why, to my reading, this bill
seems to only allow capacity for one company. Because of the
limits in terms of megawatts on this bill, it seems to me like it's
61. An Act to Amend Chapter 32 of the Acts of 2015, the Marine Renewable-energy
Act, S.N.S. 2017, c 12 (Can.).
62. Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 63rd Assembly, 1st Sess (12 October
2017), at 1153 (Hon Geoff MacLellan).
63. Id. at 1155.
64. Legislative Assembly Committee on Resource (23 February 2012) supra, note 59.
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very specifically designed for one idea, and I always think that's a
little bit dangerous in terms of legislation.65
Despite Mrs. Lisa Robert’s wish to see a revised bill after thorough
examination by the Law Amendments Committee, the amending act was
passed without any modifications. 66
Mr. Alan MacMaster of the legislative assembly also took the time to
voice his concerns on the development of marine renewable energy law
during the second reading of the amending act. His intervention concerned
the Petit Passage, an area which the Act designates as a MREA, and
therefore allows energy development within its confines. 67 MacMaster,
while believing in the economic benefits of the tidal industry, held that
fishermen were worried about the Petit Passage being cut in half with the
arrival of tidal turbines. 68 To this, MacMaster added that the Petit Passage
is “one of the most prime areas in the province to see a whale” and “if
technology is being introduced into an area that’s sensitive like that, we
can see why people are concerned.” 69
It’s worth noting that the Petit Passage is labelled as ecologically and
biologically significant under the federal Coastal Plan for the Bay of
Fundy. 70 The federal Coastal Plan had therefore already pointed to the
overlap between tidal energy sites and priority conservation areas such as
the Petit Passage, roughly coinciding with Mr. MacMaster’s remark on the
area’s significance for marine mammals. These corroborating statements
are alarming when assessed from the angle of marine spatial planning, or
rather a certain disregard for its underlying principles. Some authors, in
fact, highlight that MREAs did not “undergo a formally structured
planning framework” and this explains their inconvenient location in
terms of environmental protection. 71 Sangiuliano and Mastrantonis
suggest that a formal marine spatial plan would have had the effect of

65. Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 63rd Assembly, 1st Sess (12 October
2017), at 1162 (Lisa Roberts).
66. Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 63rd Assembly, 1st Sess (18 October
2017), at 1488.
67. Marine Renewable-energy Act, S.N.S. 2015, c 32 Schedule F (Can.).
68. Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 63rd Assembly, 1st Sess (12 October
2017), at 1158 (Allan MacMaster).
69. Id.
70. Regional Oceans Plan, supra note 4, at 24.
71. Stephen Sangiuliano & Stanley Mastrantonis, From Scotland to New Scotland:
Constructing a Sectoral Marine Plan for Tidal Energy for Nova Scotia, 84 MARINE POLICY
1−11, 2 (2017).
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spatially defining MREAs differently than was done in the Act’s
schedules. 72
This last point merits further explanation. Sangiuliano and
Mastrantonis carried out a theoretical construction of a marine spatial plan
for Nova Scotia based on the criteria utilized in the Scottish model. The
authors concluded that the Petit Passage MREA, as described in the Act,
should have been smaller in size due to constraints “associated with
shipping, commercial fishing, tourism and recreational use, and
indigenous cultural use.” 73 Fishermen’s concerns regarding shrinkage of
the passage with the arrival of tidal turbines paired with Sangiuliano and
Mastrantonis’ proposition to reduce the size of the Petit Passage MREA
because of commercial fishing are strikingly reconciling positions rooted
in marine spatial planning. What’s more, these two authors also noted that
the Digby Gut MREA, not far from the Petit Passage, should have never
been statutorily established by the Marine Renewable-energy Act due to a
“heavy constraint emanating from marine mammal habitat, commercial
shipping, and indigenous cultural use.” 74 This is also not without recalling
Mr. MacMaster’s observations on the region’s appeal for whale sightings.
Sangiuliano and Mastrantonis’ theoretical construction of a marine
spatial plan for the Bay of Fundy is an eye-opening exercise that illustrates
the real dangers associated with an industry-driven approach, which is at
odds with the basic foundations of integrated ocean management.
Furthermore, the corroborating information conveyed by Mr. MacMaster
during parliamentary debate, the federal Coastal Plan, and Sangiuliano and
Mastrantonis article is strong evidence that MREAs, as currently
established, did not frame the marine renewable energy sector to stay clear
of imminent environmental, social and commercial conflicts.
Thus, despite some form of spatial awareness in the Marine
Renewable-energy Act, namely through the establishment of confined
Marine Renewable Electricity Areas, the above illustrates how a lack of
intersectoral, pre-emptive and integrated planning undermines the
effectiveness of MREAs, while posing significant problems to
environmental interests and traditional coastal activities. Moreover, the
Act has made apparent the existing uncertainty regarding jurisdictional
control over parts of the Bay of Fundy. Beyond foreseeable consultation
provisions which open the door to a federal role in ocean energy
management, 75 the Act also excludes “any and all privately owned land
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Marine Renewable-energy Act, S.N.S. 2015, c 32, § 51 (Can.).
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and land under the administration of Canada” from MREAs. 76 Whether or
not “land” includes submerged areas is a question that has been previously
raised in constitutional interpretation. 77 Only future interpretations of the
Act will reveal what exactly is meant by this exclusion with regard to
MREAs. 78
The previous section relating to the marine renewable energy policy
framework attempted to set out the relationship between jurisdictional
ambiguity and the lack of cohesive ocean management. This section has
drawn attention to the Act’s sector-based approach, an unsurprising
outcome considering the examined background policy, and concretely
illustrated the multidimensional implications of a legal framework that
sets aside the principles of marine spatial planning. From a geopolitical
standpoint, spatial planning is simply not possible when federal and
provincial governments are unsure of where one’s jurisdiction ends and
where the other’s jurisdiction begins. This political obstacle to integrated
and planned coastal management, as posited earlier, can be traced back to
federal-provincial feuds on domestic boundaries in the Bay of Fundy. Part
III of this paper tells the tale of shifting maritime borders in the area and
discusses how unsettled claims of jurisdiction have shaped the current law
and policy.
III. AN INCONSISTENT HISTORY OF BOUNDARIES IN THE BAY OF
FUNDY
A. The Colonial Boundaries of the Bay
From the beginning, Great Britain took the position, both in its
international and municipal dealings, that the bays in the Atlantic region
were integral parts of the territory of the colonies. 79
In 1621, the grant of Nova Scotia to Sir William Alexander described
the western boundary of the province as a “straight line crossing the
entrance or mouth of that great ship road” from Saint Mary’s Bay to the

76. See, e.g., Id. at Schedules D-F.
77. Nichols & Monahan, supra note 7 at 4.
78. See, e.g., Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c 33 (Can.)
and Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, S.C. 2012 c 19, § 52 (Can.) for
statutes including submerged areas under the definition of “federal land.”
79. Gérard V. La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters of the Atlantic Provinces and the
Bay of Fundy Incident, 1 THE CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 149-171, 150
(1963) [hereinafter La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters].
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River Ste-Croix. 80 The “great ship road,” as it was later explained, in fact
referred to the Bay of Fundy. 81 The grant to Sir William Alexander had
the effect of enclosing the Bay of Fundy within the province of Nova
Scotia, at the time including modern-day New Brunswick. 82 Although
some doubt existed as to whether “the limits mentioned in the Alexander
grant were the true limits of the province,” 83 the bay’s inclusion within the
confines of Nova Scotia was confirmed in the commission to Montague
Wilmot in 1763 and in the commission to Lord William Campbell in
1765. 84 Both these commissions described Nova Scotia’s western
boundary as a line drawn “across the entrance of the Bay of Fundy” from
Cape Sable to the River St. Croix. 85
Shortly after the Thirteen Colonies gained their independence from
Great Britain and formed the United States in 1776, groups faithful to the
British Crown began making their way into Nova Scotia. 86 These settlers
gathered in large numbers along the mouth of the Saint John river, not far
from its point of discharge into the Bay of Fundy, in what is nowadays part
of New Brunswick. The banks of the Saint John river became populated
with Loyalists coming from the newly formed United States. Great Britain
therefore sought to create a new province, one with a closer administrative
pole than Halifax. 87 Under this context, the king set a Royal Commission
establishing the province of New Brunswick in 1784. The letters patent
issued by the British crown, the ones which established the province of
New Brunswick, described colonel Thomas Carleton’s appointment as
governor of the province and established the southern boundary of New
Brunswick in the terms expressed below:
Wee reposing especial Trust and Confidence in the prudence,
Courage and Loyalty of you the said Thomas Carleton, of our
especial Grace certain Knowledge and mere Motion, have thought
fit to constitute and appoint you the said Thomas Carleton to be
80. John B. Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the
United States Has Been a Party 1, 51 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898).
81. Id. at 50.
82. Gérard V. La Forest, Natural Resources and Public Property under the Canadian
Constitution 86 (University of Toronto Press, 1969) [hereinafter La Forest, Natural
Resources and Public Property].
83. Moore, supra, note 80 at 51.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. W. M. Jarvis, “Royal Commission and Instructions to Governor Thomas Carleton,
August, 1784” in Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society 6, 391 (Saint John,
NB: The Sun Printing Company Limited, 1905).
87. Id. at 392.
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our Captain General and Governor in Chief of our province of
New Brunswick bounded . . . to the South by a Line in the Center
of the Bay of Fundy from the River Saint Croix aforesaid to the
Mouth of the Musquat River by the said River to its source. 88
Similarly, the Royal Commission to Lord Elgin, in 1846, described the
western boundary of the province of Nova Scotia as being “a line drawn
from Cape Sable across the entrance to the centre of the Bay of Fundy”
and the northern boundary being “a line drawn along the centre of the said
bay to the mouth of the Musquat river.” 89 As a result of these two Royal
Commissions, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were clearly divided by a
middle line in the Bay of Fundy.
In the years preceding the Canadian confederation, several indicators
showed that Great Britain considered the Bay of Fundy to be an integral
part of its provincial colonies. For example, An Act to Compel Vessels
Navigating in the Bay of Fundy to Carry Lights, 90 passed in 1858 by the
provincial government of New Brunswick under authority of the Crown,
required vessels navigating in the Bay of Fundy to carry “a good signal
light,” failure to comply would result in a fine “of five pounds for each
and every neglect.” 91 Although the act referred to the Bay of Fundy as a
whole and did not make a distinction between parts under Nova Scotian
jurisdiction and those under New Brunswick jurisdiction, it is clear that
the provincial parliament considered the bay to be fully within the British
colony. However short, the act-imposed requirements on vessels
navigating in those waters and implicitly recognized power of the coastal
authority to collect penalties associated with breach of the act. The content
of this act confirms Ballem’s assertion that maritime provinces can
provide statutory evidence of their exercise of jurisdiction in the Bay of
Fundy prior to Confederation. 92
The boundaries of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were, as
discussed above, originally established by executive acts of the British
Crown. The Royal Commissions setting the limits of both provinces came
from the English monarch and enjoyed highest authority at a time when

88. Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
89. La Forest, National Resources and the Public Property, supra, note 82 at 86 n.7
(explaining that this information was provided to him by the Department of the Attorney
General of Nova Scotia).
90. An Act to Compel Vessels Navigating in the Bay of Fundy to Carry Lights, Acts
of the General Assembly of Her Majesty’s Province of New Brunswick, 1858, 21 Vict., c
13 (Eng.).
91. Id.
92. Ballem, supra, note 12 at 268.
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the sovereign’s powers enabled him to demarcate the territory of his
colonies. 93 To this day, these commissions continue to be the main
grounds for colonial territorial claims based on historic titles. 94 The line at
the centre of the Bay of Fundy, insofar as it represents the colonial
boundary brought into Confederation by New Brunswick and Nova Scotia,
has significant jurisdictional implications.95
Referring to the letters patent (or commissions) establishing provincial
boundaries, Gérard La Forest stated that “these prerogative instruments
had virtually statutory force.” 96 Similarly, W. M. Jarvis wrote in 1905 that
“[n]o question . . . can now arise as to the authority of Governor Carleton's
Commission and Instructions or the later Commissions issued to other
Governors in similar terms.” 97 Both La Forest and Jarvis have pointed to
the widespread recognition of boundaries established by Royal
Commission, namely in subsequent acts adopted by British and Canadian
parliaments. 98 These Royal Commissions form the point of departure to
study the Bay of Fundy’s modern geopolitical construction. 99
In 1867, the Constitution Act declared that “the Provinces of Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick shall have the same limits as at the passing of
this Act.” 100 These limits would have apparently been those established by
the Royal Commissions referred to in the paragraphs above. For some, the
inclusion of such boundaries within the Constitution Act of 1867 gave the
Royal Commissions “whatever of validity may have at first been
wanting.” 101 However, others theorize that if a Canadian court were to find
the offshore grants made in the Royal Commissions invalid under
international law, Nova Scotia’s claim to the Bay of Fundy on grounds of
these commissions would fail. 102
The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration was the first postConfederation instance in which conflicting claims in the Bay of Fundy
implicitly questioned the scope of the Royal Commissions. In 1910, Great93. La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters, supra note 79, at 156.
94. See, e.g., Dief Wants Russians out of the Bay of Fundy, The Telegraph-Journal
(Nov. 16, 1962), at 3 (telegraph text of New Brunswick Prime Minister Robichaud).
95. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 7 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1895,
app ǁ, no 5 (Can.).
96. La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters, supra note 79, at 156.
97. Jarvis, supra note 86, at 394.
98. Id.; see La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters, supra note 79, at 156.
99. See Jarvis, supra note 86, at 394.
100. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 7 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1895,
app ǁ, no 5 (Can.).
101. Jarvis, supra note 86, at 394.
102. Edward C. Foley, Nova Scotia's Case for Coastal and Offshore Resources, 13
OTTAWA L. REV. 281-308, 283-84 & 284 n.17 (1981).
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Britain (still negotiating on behalf of Canada on international matters) and
the United States submitted a dispute to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. 103 Their dispute concerned the United States’ rights of fishing
in Canadian and British Atlantic waters. Specifically, the matter related to
the interpretation of a treaty concluded between the United States and
Great Britain in 1818, under which the United States namely renounced a
right to fish within three marine miles of bays “of His Britannic Majesty’s
Dominions in America.” 104
In interpreting the relevant treaty provision, the Court concluded that
the three miles were to be measured “from a straight line drawn across the
body of water at the place where it ceases to have the configuration and
characteristics of a bay.” 105 However, this rule might not have enclosed
the Bay of Fundy in the same way that the grant to Sir William Alexander
did. This is because the Court suggested the application of such rule to
bays, not exceeding ten miles in width, excepting those bays recognized
as territorial. 106 If the bay did not fit one of these two categories, “the three
marine miles [were] to be measured following the sinuosities of the
coast.” 107 It is perhaps this very debate on the nature of the Bay of Fundy
which caused British and American representatives to exclude it from the
arbitration. Through an exchange of letters, British and American
ambassadors agreed that “no question as to the Bay of Fundy, considered
as a whole” was to be included in the arbitration “it being the intention of
the parties that their respective views or contentions” should not be
affected by the Court’s findings. 108
The exclusion of the Bay of Fundy from the arbitration was significant
in that it revealed Great Britain’s strong territorial attachment and
historical claims to the bay as well as American protests of such claims.
Excluding the Bay of Fundy from the arbitration was however a doubleedged sword. While it did not subject the Bay of Fundy to a three-mile
limit “following the sinuosities of the coast” (and thus opening the central
portion of the bay to foreign fishing), it also had the effect of leaving
unconfirmed the status of those waters. Great-Britain’s exercise of
jurisdiction within the bay might have been enough for the Permanent
Court of Arbitration to conclude that the Bay of Fundy was territorial and
close it off to American fishers.109 This could have prevented subsequent
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

N. Atl. Coast Fisheries (U.K. v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 167, 167 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910).
Id. at 171, 174.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 199, 196.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 220-21.
Id. at 199; La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters, supra, note 79 at 162.
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confusion explored in the following section. In fact, La Forest argued that
Great Britain’s exercise of jurisdiction in the Bay of Fundy was apparent
since “a substantial number of the seizures of American ships for violating
the 1818 convention” happened within its waters. 110
La Forest admitted, that “as a matter of courtesy, Great Britain allowed
American fishermen to fish within the Bay of Fundy, but recalled that
“relaxations of a claim [of territoriality] should not be construed as
renunciations of it” because “[s]uch a construction . . . would not only be
intrinsically inequitable, but internationally injurious, in that it would
discourage conciliatory diplomatic transactions and encourage the
assertion of extreme claims in their fullest extent.” 111
B. The Russian Fleet Incident: A Contradictory Discourse
In 1936, the parliament of Canada adopted An Act to Amend the
Customs Act. 112 The Act described “Canadian waters” as “all territorial
waters of Canada and all waters forming part of the territory of Canada,”
which the Minister of National Revenue also described as “roughly
speaking . . . all the marine league, that is the waters included within the
three mile limit” from the shore.113 He also specified, that “the powers to
be exercised outside the marine league, outside of Canadian waters, socalled, are very limited” and that these were, in essence, police powers. 114
According to the maps released by the Canadian Department of National
Revenue by virtue of certain provisions of the Act, the central part of the
Bay of Fundy, that is, the portion beyond the three mile limit calculated
from the coast, was excluded from the national territory. This was a rather
peculiar delimitation since it appeared to contradict Sir William
Alexander’s grant. This grant, as it should be recalled, had included the
bay within Nova Scotia and, a fortiori, within Canada following section 7
of the Constitution Act, 1867.
The Customs Act’s delimitation of Canadian waters in the Bay of
Fundy therefore operated as a drastic rupture from the previously strong
colonial position that the bay in its entirety fell under Canadian
jurisdiction. Oddly, the three-mile limit adhered to by the Department of
National Revenue strongly resembled what would have been the three-

110. La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters, supra, note 79 at 161.
111. Id.; The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case, supra, note 103 at 199.
112. An Act to Amend the Customs Act, S.C. 1936, c 30 (Can).
113. House of Commons Debates, 18th Parl, 1st Sess, No 4 (29 May 1936), at 3221
(Hon James Lorimer Ilsley).
114. Id.
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mile limit “following the sinuosities of the coast” developed in the North
Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration. This is precisely the kind of
delimitation that Great Britain tried to avoid by excluding the Bay of
Fundy from the arbitration. While the Canadian parliament’s endorsement
of the three-mile limit perhaps rested on existing customary practice in
international maritime boundary delimitation, this resonated with
Harrison’s assertion that Canada confused, from this point onwards, its
claims under international law and those strictly concerned with domestic
matters on federal-provincial coastal jurisdiction. 115
The federal government’s unilateral definition of Canadian waters in
the Customs Act marked the beginning of federal-provincial tensions
regarding the status of the Bay of Fundy. It appears from chapter twentyeight, section three of the Constitution Act, 1871 116 that the Canadian
parliament could only alter the boundaries of provinces with the consent
of concerned provincial legislatures. 117 A unilateral act from the Canadian
parliament could not bypass Nova Scotia and New Brunswicks’ claims to
the bay and alter their British-drawn limits. 118 While some were of the
view that the boundaries reflected in those maps were for the sole purpose
of regulating customs and were without prejudice to Canadian territorial
claims, 119 this view is challenged by the language employed in the Act, the
comments made by the Minister of National Revenue, and subsequent
federal government behavior.
In the early sixties, an incident involving the presence of a Russian
fleet in the Bay of Fundy forced the federal government to take a position
with respect to those waters. Unfortunately, federal officials did not speak
with one voice and addressed the issue in a rather clumsy manner. On
November 14, 1962, the New Brunswick Telegraph-Journal published an
article quoting a federal government official saying that “as long as [the
Russians] stayed outside the three-mile limit, they would be subject to no
restrictions from Canada.” 120 Although the Canadian government’s
inaction might have shocked more than a few at the peak of the Cold War,
this position seemed consistent with the earlier views expressed by the
Minister of National Revenue concerning the country’s boundaries and the
statutory definition of Canadian waters expressed in the Customs Act.
115. Rowland J. Harrison, Jurisdiction over the Canadian Offshore: A Sea of Confusion,
17 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL, 469-505, 501 (1979).
116. Constitution Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict. c. 28 (Eng.).
117. Id. at § 3 La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters, supra note 79, at 168.
118. La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters, supra 79, at 168.
119. Id. at 167.
120. Dave Butler, The Russians in the Bay of Fundy, The Telegraph-Journal (Nov. 14,
1962).
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The Telegraph-Journal reporter also noted that the Russian fleet,
although alarmingly close to Canadian coasts, had stayed clear of the
three-mile limit and anchored ten miles from the New Brunswick port of
Saint John. 121 This was possibly due to a recognition, on both the Canadian
and Russian sides, that Canada’s jurisdiction did not extend beyond three
miles from the shore, a position clearly at odds with the provincial
delineations of the Royal Commissions.
On the same day of the Telegraph-Journal’s first report of the Russian
fleet incident in the Maritimes, Premier Robichaud of New Brunswick sent
a telegram to federal Prime Minister Diefenbaker, with a copy to Nova
Scotian Prime Minister Robert L. Stanfield.122 In the telegram, Premier
Robichaud stated:
I am very much disturbed at the newspaper report regarding the
presence of a Russian fishing fleet in the Bay of Fundy. . . . This
report in part states “No particular interest is being shown the fleet
by the Canadian departments of fisheries and transport.” . . . The
Bay of Fundy is an integral part of the Provinces of New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia. It is so described in the commission
establishing Nova Scotia, then including New Brunswick, in
1621. . . . The commission of Sir Thomas Carleton gave the
boundaries of New Brunswick as including the northern half of
Bay of Fundy. . . . These boundaries were preserved by section 7
of the BNA Act . . . . Request Canada protest to Russia in violation
of Canadian territory. 123
Prime Minister Diefenbaker, after receiving the telegram, addressed the
issue in the House of Commons. 124 He asserted having examined previous
debates pertaining to Canadian jurisdiction in coastal waters, and
specifically, “whether or not the three mile limit applie[d] in certain areas
such as in the Bay of Fundy.” 125 He noted that a decision on the appropriate
course of action was still pending. 126 When Mr. Pearson, then leader of
the opposition, asked the Prime Minister to explain why this situation was
121. Id.
122. Dief Wants Russians out of the Bay of Fundy, The Telegraph-Journal (Nov. 16,
1962) at 1.
123. Id. at 3 (quoting Dave Butler, The Russians in the Bay of Fundy, The TelegraphJournal (Nov. 14, 1962)(first citing Moores Arbitrations, Vol. 1, at 33,50; and then citing
Canadian Sessional Papers of 1881, No. 70 at 47).
124. House of Commons Debates, 25th Parl, 1st Sess, No 2 (14 November 1962), at
1617 (Right Hon JG Diefenbaker).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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different from previous cases in which Canada had protested against the
presence of American fishing vessels in the Bay of Fundy, Prime Minister
Diefenbaker stated that this was “the type of question which require[d]
notice in order that the situation may be looked into.” 127 The issue of the
Russian fishing fleet was again raised in the House of Commons the
following day. Prime Minister Diefenbaker, responding to a question from
the opposition as to whether the Canadian government would take any
action, stated that:
[t]he Bay of Fundy has always been considered, since the earliest
days, first by Great Britain and thereafter by successive Canadian
Governments, as Canadian territorial waters. As far back as 1763
it was described in official documents as being comprised within
the boundaries of what is now Canada. There are strong
geographic and economic considerations for this. Having regard
to the fact that there have been two Soviet vessels in this area,
instructions have been given that if these vessels, whose presence
was reported yesterday, have not left already, they will be made
aware of the position Canada takes and requested to leave. 128
The federal government oscillated between a position reflective of its
then recent maps and statutes, ones which placed the national boundary at
three miles from the shore, and a position which reflected the historical
character of the Bay with an emphasis on the boundaries that Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick brought into Confederation. Prime Minister
Diefenbaker’s implicit message was that, after due consideration, the
three-mile limit did not apply to the Bay of Fundy. He therefore ordered
that action be taken against the presence of the Russian vessels. This
seemed, at first glance, a victory for Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
However, the assertions of Premier Robichaud and those of Premier
Diefenbaker require further semantical attention.
In his telegram, Premier Robichaud insisted that “[t]he Bay of Fundy
[was] an integral part of the Provinces of New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia.” 129 Although Premier Diefenbaker’s later discourse seemed to
echo Robichaud’s position, it in fact asserted something meaningfully
different; “the Bay of Fundy has always been considered . . . as Canadian
territorial waters. . . . [I]t was described in official documents as being

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Dief Wants Russians out of the Bay of Fundy, supra note 122 (emphasis added).
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comprised within the boundaries of what is now Canada.” 130 The latter
statement is not technically incompatible with the first, but it clearly
conveyed that the federal government was not ready to recognize New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia’s claims of ownership over the Bay of Fundy.
The Canadian Parliament might have also had motives other than
those resting on historical titles for showing some teeth in the later stages
of the Russian fleet incident. In the past, the government had struggled to
justify the narrow definition of Canadian waters within the Customs Act,
seeing as it “had defined [these] waters . . . more narrowly than was
necessary.” 131 Indeed, the government was asked on multiple occasions
why it had chosen a three-mile instead of a twelve-mile limit to its coastal
jurisdiction. 132 Perhaps the federal government’s volte-face after an initial
tolerance of the Russian fleet in the Bay of Fundy was triggered by a
certain awareness of this fact. Public opinion also probably played a part
in revisiting the government’s first position regarding the Soviet boats
surveying the Canadian coast.
C. Seabed Resources and the Surge of Administrative Resource
Lines
Only a few years after the Russian fleet incident, a different debate
developed out of the growing interest in minerals and oil found in the
seabed. In 1967, the Canadian government requested an opinion from the
Supreme Court of Canada regarding jurisdiction over offshore resources
in light of its existing feud with the government of British Columbia. 133
Both levels of government argued that exploitation and administration of
submerged resources fell under their sphere of competence. 134 To all the
questions submitted, which concerned proprietary rights and jurisdiction,
the Court concluded in favor of Canada. 135 The Court greatly relied on an
English case, R. v. Keyn, 136 to conclude that a province’s jurisdiction ended
130. House of Commons Debates, 25th Parl, 1st Sess, No 2 (15 November 1962) at 1650
(Right Hon JG Diefenbaker)(emphasis added).
131. La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters, supra note 79, at 168.
132. House of Commons Debates, 18th Parl, 1st Sess, No 4 (29 May 1936) at 3221 (“Mr.
Bennett: Why did they make it that rather than twelve miles?”); House of Commons
Debates, 25th Parl, 1st Sess, No 2 (15 November 1962) at 1650 (Mr. Barry Mather[:][W]ill
the government consider amending the coastal waters act to establish a 12 mile fishing
limit?”).
133. Reference Re: Offshore Mineral Rights, 792 SCR (1967) (Can.).
134. Id., at 796.
135. Id., at 821-22.
136. R v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63 (1876).
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at a point commonly referred to as the “ordinary low-water mark” unless
historical titles and positive exercise of jurisdiction by the province (prior
to Confederation) could be demonstrated. 137
Some put forth that the Court’s conclusions were without prejudice
to the claims of other provinces since the opinion was specific to the case
of British Columbia. 138 Moreover, as made apparent through the second
part of the paper, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have seemingly strong
evidence to support a historical claim in the Bay of Fundy, which could
grant them jurisdiction over the waters and the seabed. 139 Harrison and
Doelle are of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada, in Reference Re:
Offshore mineral rights, implicitly recognized the historical title of these
two maritime provinces over the Bay of Fundy, while nevertheless
pointing to the non-binding character of the Court’s opinion. 140 In the
Reference, the Court alluded to a New Brunswick case in which the
provincial court found that a ship seizure in the Bay of Fundy occurred
within the territory of the province. 141 The Supreme Court of Canada,
taking into account the Royal Commission to Thomas Carleton and the
boundary drawn at the centre of the Bay of Fundy, confirmed that this
seizure happened “within the Province of New Brunswick.” 142 However,
this distinguishing by the Court was soon after tempered by high-level
political statements.
Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in the aftermath of the
Supreme Court’s opinion, addressed the House of Commons and stated:
The reference to the Supreme Court was designed to determine in
the most authoritative way where the jurisdiction rests. . . . In light
of the Supreme Court’s unanimous finding in favor of the crown
in right of Canada, on the basis of principles that would appear
to be substantially applicable to the east coast as well as to the
west coast, the main problem becomes one of delineating the areas
concerned to meet the practical requirements of mineral resource
administration. . . . [W]e have drawn so-called mineral resource
administration lines, always well within the area of federal
jurisdiction on the basis of the principles laid down in the Supreme
Court opinion, with the intention that the federal government will
137. Reference Re: Offshore Mineral Rights, 792, 804-807 SCR (1967) (Can.).
138. See Harrison, supra note 115, at 470; Ballem, supra note 12, at 264; House of
Commons Debates, 28th Parl, 1st Sess, No 3 (2 December 1968) at 3344 (Mr. Baldwin).
139. Ballem, supra note 12, at 268.
140. Harrison, supra note 115, at 500; Doelle et al., supra note 10, at 11.
141. Reference Re: Offshore Mineral Rights, 792, 809 SCR (1967) (Can.).
142. Id.
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administer all offshore mineral rights seaward from these lines. . .
. The proposed administrative lines enclose several offshore
areas which are linked closely with adjacent provincial lands. . .
. Off the east coast they include large areas of the sea bottom in
the Bay of Fundy. . . . It is clearly in the interest of all levels of
government that conditions are such as to facilitate the rapid
development of Canada’s offshore minerals. For our part, we wish
to do everything possible to avoid jurisdictional disputes that
would hinder or delay the development of these natural
resources. This is the spirit in which we are offering to work out
these arrangements with the provinces. 143
Trudeau’s statement set the framework of what I, in this paper, argue
to be the modern-day approach to ocean governance in the face of
jurisdictional ambiguity. Several of his remarks are worth commenting on.
First, Trudeau raised considerable doubts regarding the scope of the
Supreme Court reference by claiming a pan-Canadian application of the
Court’s findings. 144 Second, the Prime Minister developed a system that
shut the door to further claims of jurisdiction, clearly expressing that the
federal government had no desire to pursue domestic boundary debates. 145
This desire to avoid domestic jurisdictional discourse has been present
ever since. Third, Trudeau institutionalized an issue-driven practice when
developing administrative lines for the sole purpose of regulating offshore
mineral resources. The relevance of those lines and those that followed
(for example, those of the offshore oil industry) seems unclear with respect
to other offshore activities such as marine renewable energy. Fourth, the
Prime Minister’s initiative to develop administrative lines with no
territorial (and jurisdictional) implications added confusion to an already
complex governance structure under Canadian federalism.
Trudeau’s federal resource administration lines closed off the Bay of
Fundy and recognized the right of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to
administer mineral resources in the bay. However, they did not contribute
to greater territorial clarity given their confined purpose and their lack of
jurisdictional significance. Furthermore, the resource administration lines
proposed by the federal government were contested by the Atlantic

143. House of Commons Debates, 28th Parl, 1st Sess, No 3 (2 December 1968), at 3342
(Right Hon Pierre Elliott Trudeau)(emphasis added).
144. Harrison, supra note 115, at 469.
145. Logan, supra note 13, at 162. (“by drawing the mineral resource administration
lines entirely within areas of federal sovereignty, Ottawa is clearly trying to avoid the
thorny question of precisely defining provincial limits”).
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provinces and Québec in a 1972 communiqué. 146 Instead, these provinces
urged Ottawa to recognize the boundaries that were agreed upon among
themselves at an earlier date, largely reflecting the limits defined in a 1964
joint statement.147
In 1964, the four Atlantic provinces had indeed drawn their
interprovincial boundaries without the federal government’s participation
and included them in a joint statement. 148 In this statement, Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick relied on the line in middle of the Bay of Fundy to
divide their provinces. However, the full extent of this delimitation was
unclear. It was only in 2001, when a dispute arose between Newfoundland,
Labrador and Nova Scotia regarding their interprovincial boundaries, that
an arbitral tribunal clarified the scope of the document. While Nova Scotia
aggressively argued that the document reflected an “agreement” binding
between the parties, 149 the tribunal came to the opposite conclusion. It
noted that “[t]he tenor of the Joint Statement [was] inconsistent with any
intent to enter into a final and binding agreement with immediate effect,”
and that, “[t]he terms of the Joint Statement [were] more consistent with a
political, provisional or tentative agreement, which may [have led] to a
formal agreement but which [was] not in itself that agreement.” 150
It’s important to add that in 1972, when the Atlantic provinces and
Québec contested the federal resource administration lines and put forward
their own boundary delimitation, Premier Regan of Nova Scotia ensured
correspondence with Ottawa. 151 Regan sent a telegraph to Prime Minister
Trudeau with the claims of the 1972 communiqué and, in turn, received a
letter from his federal counterpart stating Ottawa’s refusal to recognize the
interprovincial boundaries agreed among the Atlantic provinces. 152
Trudeau’s letter indicated that “ownership and the extent of provincial
territory, as well as the location of provincial boundaries are matters of
law. The only way they can properly be settled, if the provinces definitely
wish to contest them, is in the Supreme Court.” 153 Trudeau added that he
saw “no purpose to be served by discussion of these legal matters.” 154 In
1977, the federal government signed a Memorandum of Understanding
146. Arbitration between Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia Concerning
Portions of their Limits of Offshore Areas Phase 1 (2001), at 55.
147. Id. at 55-58.
148. Id. at 30.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 77.
151. Id. at 55.
152. Id. at 58.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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with Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island in which it
recognized the 1964 lines for resource administration purposes, but not as
provincial boundaries. 155
The government of Canada therefore presented litigation as the only
effective means of settling the federal-provincial boundary dispute. As a
result, the jurisdictional debate in the political sphere has been completely
cut off. In the Atlantic region, only Newfoundland and Labrador turned
to the courts to resolve its maritime claims. 156 A clear prohibition of
boundary-related discussions between federal and provincial governments
combined with a political back and forth on the status of the Bay of Fundy
and visible confusion regarding single-purpose delimitations has resulted
in the current “tippy-toed” approach to ocean governance. This approach,
described at length in the first part of this paper as regards marine
renewable energy law and policy, is confirmed by practice in the offshore
oil and gas sector. On this issue, Canadian and Nova Scotian governments
have “agreed to disagree” 157 and, in the process of doing so, adopted an
overly cautious method of addressing offshore management.
While a thorough examination of the history and functioning of the
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board is beyond the scope of this
paper, some elements supporting this paper’s claims are worth noting. In
1986, the federal and provincial governments concluded the Canada-Nova
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord, which was later
implemented through “mirror” legislation. 158 This practice, which consists
of enacting equivalent legislation at federal and provincial levels, has the
effect of bypassing the issue of jurisdiction. 159 Both the Canada-Nova
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act 160 (at
federal level) and the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources
Accord Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act 161 (at provincial level) describe

155. Id. at 59-60, note 106; Federal-Provincial Memorandum of Understanding in
Respect of the Administration and Management of Mineral Resources Offshore of the
Maritime Provinces (February 1, 1977).
156. Reference re Newfoundland Continental Shelf, 1 SCR 86 (1984).
157. William Lahey, Regulation and Development of a New Energy Industry: Tidal
Energy in Nova Scotia, 3 ENERGY REGULATION QUARTERLY 3 note 74, (2015).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act,
S.C. 1988, c 28.
161. Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova
Scotia) Act, S.N.S 1987 c 3.
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the limits of the offshore areas under joint management. 162 For the Bay of
Fundy, the limit essentially reflects the 1964 and 1977 administration line,
cutting the bay in half.
However, both governments have clearly forbidden territorial claims
based on the provisions of those implementing acts. The federal statute
reads, “[f]or greater certainty, the provisions of this Act shall not be
interpreted as providing a basis for any claim by or on behalf of any
province in respect of any interest in or legislative jurisdiction over any
offshore area or any living or non-living resources of any offshore area.” 163
Similarly, Nova Scotia’s implementing act states that “[t]he provisions of
this Act shall not be construed as providing a basis for any claim by or on
behalf of the Government of Canada in respect of any entitlement to or
legislative jurisdiction over the offshore area or any living or non-living
resources in the offshore area.” 164
When it comes to offshore governance, the government of Canada
and the government of Nova Scotia both address the issue as though
walking on eggshells. Regulation is replete with disclaimers, as each
government avoids giving the other reason to believe that they have
somehow ceded to their claims of jurisdiction. In the process of being
excessively cautious, both governments have developed an approach to
ocean governance that is issue-driven, narrowly defined and
jurisdictionally ambiguous. This is the legacy of historically inconsistent
discourse on domestic boundaries.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper first examined the coastal law and policy applicable to
marine renewable energy in the Bay of Fundy. It focused on the political
arguments supporting the existing framework and on the legislative
history of the Marine Renewable Energy Act, with a view to highlight a
well-engrained issue-driven approach to ocean governance. The paper
examined the marine renewable energy law and policy in light of the
Fournier report to demonstrate a clear disconnect between enacted
legislation and strong calls to develop integrated ocean management and
spatial planning approaches. It showed that legal and policy decisions
162. Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act,
S.C. 1988, c 28, Schedule II; Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord
Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act, S.N.S. 1987 c 3, Schedule II.
163. Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act,
S.C. 1988, c 28, s 3.
164. Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act
(Nova Scotia) Act, S.N.S. 1987 c 3, s 3.
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impeding inclusive and spatially aware management were directly or
indirectly shaped by jurisdictional considerations. The second part of the
paper placed the emphasis on the Bay of Fundy’s geopolitical
delimitations throughout history, demonstrating that jurisdictional
hesitation has in fact developed out of ambiguities concerning domestic
boundaries. The paper studied resource administration lines and marked
that they added a layer of confusion while leaving unresolved the
jurisdictional debate. It concluded with a brief assessment of the federalprovincial arrangements in the oil and gas sector in what marks a fullcircle with the paper’s initial arguments on issue-driven, overly-cautious
and jurisdictionally vague approaches to coastal management.
Uncertainty in jurisdiction is the most significant barrier to organized
marine planning. 165 Jurisdictional boundaries matter. They are especially
relevant in view of current environmental challenges that require
comprehensive approaches rather than issue-driven ones. Furthermore,
technological developments and increasing offshore activity, namely
related to marine renewable energy, make sustainable frameworks an
urgent necessity. Resolution of federal-provincial conflicts of jurisdiction
through a judicial or political boundary delimitation in the Bay of Fundy
is crucial to the integrated management of the bay’s uses and resources.

165. Nichols & Monahan, supra note 7 at 4.

